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Dutch and Iranian Media Discourses in the Post-Iranian Uprising 
Payal Arora and Ashok Panikkar  
 
Abstract 
Playing the role of mediator between Islam and the West is one that is particularly fraught with 
danger. Mediators often find themselves in a critical dilemma of placement of the self within 
larger contesting discourses. Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss-born Islamic scholar, is one such appointed 
mediator between Dutch statehood and its multiethnic Islamic population. He was invited by the 
Rotterdam City Council to serve as an integration advisor for its multicultural population. 
However, his affiliation with an Iranian TV station sponsored by the regime caused considerable 
consternation, with his credibility being questioned by the Council. The post-Iranian election and 
uprising triggered a wave of reactions culminating in the dismissal of this prominent scholar, 
recently named by Time magazine as one of the world’s top one hundred scientists and thinkers. 
This chapter focuses on the nature of media discourses and ideological leanings among key 
actors to explain how these issues can escalate, often with severe consequences to those 
involved. The authors use this event as a springboard to analyze the role of public mediators in 
complex political and cultural environments, using the lens of mediation and dialogue. By 
attending to issues of language and the framing of perspectives in the media, this chapter 
proposes a nuanced and novel approach to mediation and discourse construction in arenas of 
chronic dispute. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
THE CONTROVERSIAL CELEBRITY MEDIATOR BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE 
WEST 
Tariq Ramadan is a Swiss-born Arab Muslim scholar and activist renowned 
for his expansive contributions to the understanding of Muslims in European 
society. He has been placed by the British Prospect and the American 
Foreign Policy magazines as eighth in a list of the world’s top one hundred 
contemporary intellectuals in 2008 (List 2008). While Swiss in nationality, 
he comes with a notable ancestral background of political power, as the son 
of Said Ramadan and the grandson of Hassan al Banna, who in 1928 founded 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Laurence 2007). Given his unique crosscultural 
positioning, he has been sought after to serve as a key advisor and 
mediator between the West and the Islamic domains. After all, his view 
appears reconciliatory, emphasizing the distinction between religion and 
culture, where Islamic values and European citizenship are not necessarily 
in conflict. Yet, controversy seems to follow him no matter where he goes 
(Buruma 2007). In 2004, his visa to the United States was revoked using the 
ideological exclusion provision of the USA PATRIOT Act due to his visible 
vocal and financial support to the Palestinian cause, interpreted as supporting 
and financing terrorism. He has been blacklisted by Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
and Egypt. Adding to the list of tensions, he has been caught in several battles 
in France, including being accused of being an anti-Semitic for attacking 
French-Jewish intellectuals in their defense of Israel. That said, he is tremendously 
popular, particularly among young, educated European Muslims for 
negotiating Islamic and Western identity and culture and serving as a dignified 
role model to follow (Ramdani 2009). 
 
CLASH OF THE TITANS: ROTTERDAM CITY COUNCIL VERSUS TARIQ 
RAMADAN 
Tensions among the Dutch regarding the Muslim community are at an alltime 
high. Moroccan and Turkish immigrants came in large numbers in the 
1970s to labor and stayed on, balkanizing into low-income neighborhoods 
with poor housing quality, chronic unemployment, and high levels of crime. 
Distrust among the non-Muslim Dutch has not just circulated, but also exponentially 
grown particularly because incidents such as the murder of Theo 
van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Moroccan-Dutch Islamic extremist in 
November 2004, as well as the arrest of the Hofstad Group on charges of terrorism, 
mark their psyche. In the meantime, Muslims have witnessed increasing 
suspicion and fear of them that seem to gain strength as time goes on. In 
2006, a poll was taken on perceptions in Dutch society of Islam. It was found 
that 63 percent of Dutch citizens felt that Islam is incompatible with modern 
European life, and many expressed being threatened by immigrant or Muslim 
young people (Islam 2006). Such sentiments feed into further social segregation 
of the Muslim community from the rest of the society. This is reflected 
partly in contemporary Dutch politics where Geert Wilder, the hard-right, 
anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant politician, is now ahead in the EU polls, 
particularly gaining momentum on issues of immigration, beliefs of Islam, 
banning of the burqa, and control of Moroccan youth in the cities. 
While about 5 percent of the total Dutch population is Muslim, Muslims 
currently dominate the media debates on culture and politics (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2002, November). As these feelings resonate in the media 
and seep into general discourse, many Muslims claim to experience alienation 
and disconnect from both their first-generation immigrant parents and 
from Dutch society. Instead, Islam is seen as the pervasive glue, creating an 
affiliation that transcends national boundaries, creating a global Muslim community 
feeling. Therefore, the Dutch government, in order to prevent further 
alienation, hired Ramadan in 2007 to serve as a key advisor on civic integration 
and multicultural policies. In particular, he was invited by the Rotterdam 
City Council, since about half of the population in Rotterdam are not of Dutch 
origin, and the city has currently enormous socioeconomic-cultural problems. 
His duties were to provide participatory dialogues on religious identity and 
citizenship with a special emphasis on Islam as well as to shape social policies 
on Islamic-Dutch cultural integration. 
 
This relationship had already started to fray by early 2009 as Ramadan was 
accused by the Gay Krant, a newspaper for the homosexual community, for 
making homophobic and misogynistic statements. This prompted a demand 
by the right-wing political party to dismiss Ramadan as city adviser. However, 
having investigated these accusations further, the case was dropped. 
Furthermore, his hosting of the Islam and Life show on an Iranian Press TV 
station, which is financed by the Iranian regime, seemed to stir sentiments 
again. This show is intended to be primarily an educational platform on Islam 
as a way of life for a multiethnic and global audience, Muslim and non- 
Muslim alike. Yet, with the Iranian election and uprising, a renewed impetus 
to dismiss Ramadan came about, and this time succeeded. The rationale by 
the Rotterdam City Council was as follows: 
 
The council finds that in deciding to work with Press TV, Professor Ramadan 
has failed to take sufficient account of the sentiments that this might evoke in 
Rotterdam and beyond. This is made worse by the fact that he continued to work 
there after the elections in Iran when the authorities very seriously clamped 
down on freedom of speech (Van Eerten 2009). 
 
In response, Ramadan released a statement defending his choices. In essence, 
he attributes this dismissal as deeply politically driven, serving the 
upcoming Dutch elections. More importantly, he argues that any mediation 
takes place at the internal level and that it is dangerous to view the Iranian 
regime, however tempting, as a homogenous entity: 
 
In Iran, the relationship between religion and politics is extremely complex. 
The simplistic view that posits two opposing camps—the fundamentalist conservatives 
versus the democratic reformists—displays a profound ignorance of 
Iranian reality. Moreover, no evolution toward democratic transparency can 
take place under pressure from the West: the process will be internal, lengthy 
and painful (2009). 
 
DIALOGUES ACROSS CROSS-NATIONAL MEDIASCAPES 
The furor in the media mirrors the public’s confused expectations of Ramadan. 
In the next few paragraphs, we will explore why it is necessary to be 
realistic about his role as a mediator in the discourse between cultures. 
 
DEAD-ENDS IN THE ISLAM-WEST DEBATE 
Islam and Christianity have a tremendous history in the competition for converts. 
Much literature has been written about how these two great religions 
and their respective cultures interact, respond, and react to one another (Blankenhorn, 
Filali-Ansary, and Mneimneh 2005; Paden 2005). While this is not 
the place to go deeply into the reasons for such long-standing disputes and 
tensions between these two religions, it is important to keep in mind that the 
forces of globalization have compelled these two cultures to encounter one 
another more frequently, more intimately, and more visibly. These encounters 
have seeped into all realms of public life, pressurizing state involvement. 
It would be naïve to see these two forces as sharing equal platforms in power 
and politics with the state, particularly in the West. That said, it would be 
equally naïve to perceive Islamic forces as primarily victims and marginalized 
forces, given their larger global affiliation, community, and distinct and 
diverse cultures. 
 
Therefore, for the purposes of conciliation, the debate has taken on multiple 
tangents, sometimes simultaneously, of suppression, of outlawing, of 
embracing, and of understanding. One such strand in the debate is the faith 
versus freedom paradox: one party free to maintain the authenticity of their 
religion while the other party equally free to reject this very authenticity and 
even claim infringement on their public sphere. State versus religion is another 
age-old binary, where citizenship and belief struggle to reconcile. 
Multiple efforts at resolving these tensions are being undertaken; one such 
effort is to emphasize universal human values over religious specific values, 
with the idea of ironing out all differences. This, however, has been a weak 
resolve as it is too abstract and too broad to be applied to specific social 
policy. Another effort is that of multiculturalism, of live and let live; yet, this 
fosters a compartmentalization of cultures with little resemblance to social 
realities of cross-cultural interaction. A third approach has been to clearly 
state what constitutes public versus private practice since “public expression 
of religious conviction, is inherently problematic” (Blankenhorn et al. 2005). 
This erasing of difference publicly while giving free reign to it privately rests 
on the rationale that visibility of belief is prime provocation. In minimizing 
the presence of difference, social harmony can prevail. 
 
However, as we have seen in multiple recent public controversies, whether 
it was the proposition to ban the headscarf in France (Graff 2004) or the 
Swiss vote on banning the building of minarets in their country (Switzerland 
Votes 2009), this is hardly an easy idea to implement. These public controversies 
call attention to the fact that religious and cultural practices are 
hardly something that can be easily contained in the private realm without 
deeply alienating, offending, and in general, creating tremendous conflict. 
Yet another strategy of resolution is to create bifurcations within the contentious 
religious group, which in this case, would be the Islamic population. 
Therefore, media discourses of radical or fundamentalist Islam versus normal 
or moderate Islam are intended to appease both parties, acknowledging the 
plethora of violence in the name of Islam at the same time acknowledging 
that the majority of the Islamic practicing population are “decent, faithful and 
peaceful” (Blankenhorn et al. 2005). This is yet another dead end, however, 
in conflict resolution, as this framing of schizophrenia within this community 
is seen as condescending and, at worst, deeply offensive. This implies that 
membership within such a faith comes with a need to prove in public one’s 
qualification of moderation. Underlining these multiple dead ends is found in 
the following: 
 
The presumption of incompatibility has provided the dominant motif for storytelling 
about Islamic and Western cultures. Both Western observers and Muslims 
paint with broad brushstrokes when they engage in generalization about 
macro-cultural units of analysis, and fail to account for the diverse strands of 
cultural legacies. As protagonists of the story of incompatibility, they often 
resort to a language of exclusivity. This language is preoccupied with defining 
boundaries, and manifests a retreat from intercultural experiences to psychological 
and cultural segregation. Implicitly or explicitly, the “other” is depicted as 
a threatening monolith. The result is that Muslim and Western analysts have 
placed such strong emphasis on extremist tendencies among their purported 
adversaries that a “clash of symbols” has begun to emerge, in which the most superficial 
and eye-catching aspects of the “other” are highlighted at the expense 
of shared and convergent values (Said and Funk 2002). 
In essence, the differences between Islam and the West are portrayed as the 
“clash of civilizations,” a wasted effort at reconciliation where the twain shall 
never meet; counteracting this is the euphoric effort to build and demonstrate 
common grounds between these cultures, often portrayed as aligning closely 
with the Western framework of ideals and values. 
 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR IN POLITICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL 
CONFLICT? 
In order to understand the role of mediators in political or sociocultural situations, 
we need to differentiate between facilitators and mediators. At best 
a TV show host is a neutral facilitator who brings panelists with conflicting 
points of view to engage in a conversation with each other. She does not share 
her own perspectives, seek to persuade, or resolve disputes. Through skillful 
facilitation, she seeks clarification and greater understanding. At worst 
the TV host is a partisan moderator with strong views who through debate 
challenges and tries to persuade people to come around to his point of view. 
From what we understand, Tariq Ramadan was a moderator who brought a 
very specific point of view to the show, Islam and Life. This does not perforce 
mean that he could not have been neutral, just that his strong opinions within 
and outside of the show compromised his neutrality. 
 
Mediation is a dispute resolution methodology with a well-defined process. 
The mediator brings parties in conflict together, helps them develop better 
understanding, and moves them toward resolution. According to Moore, 
Mediation is generally defined as the intervention in a negotiation or a conflict 
of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative power, who assists 
the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement 
of the issues in dispute. In addition to addressing substantive issues, mediation 
may also establish or strengthen relationships of trust and respect between parties 
or terminate relationships in a manner that minimizes emotional costs and 
psychological harm (Moore 2003). 
 
While there are many schools of mediation and types of mediators, (Karpov 
and Haywood 1998; Saikal 2003), the two commonly used in political 
and sociocultural situations are third-party neutral mediators, whom I will 
call professional mediators, and credible figures from the disputing groups, 
whom I will call interested mediators. The first group has specialized training 
and a type of neutrality called omnipartiality; that is, they try to empathize 
with both sides and to help all parties meet their genuine interests. The second 
group uses its influence to bring people to the table for dialogue and to 
resolve conflict. 
 
WHY DID THE IRANIAN UPRISING SERVE AS A KEY TRIGGER TO DISMISS 
RAMADAN? 
Unlike professional mediators or genuine third-party facilitators, Ramadan, 
being from and functioning within two worlds, finds himself in the all-too 
predictable quandary of being an advisor to the two communities as well as 
trying to maintain enough distance to be credible as an intermediary. This is 
an unenviable situation for him. In a crisis situation (if it were not the Iranian 
election, it might well have been another issue some months down the line), 
his audiences would, naturally enough, force him to choose sides. It is harder 
for a nonprofessional or interested mediator (one who has substantive interests 
in the case or an investment in the outcome) to maintain distance from 
the content of the issues at stake, as opposed to the professional mediator 
whose primary interest, other than helping polarized groups engage with each 
other, is in maintaining the integrity of the process. The Iranian election was 
merely the immediate provocation; the multiple roles inhabited by Ramadan 
were eventually unsustainable. 
 
Tariq Ramadan’s role in the discourse between Islam and the West is 
shaped by his being in the awkward situation of someone who straddles 
both cultures. However, those who wanted him to be a bridge builder, one 
who could help integrate a recalcitrant Muslim minority with a restive and 
suspicious majority, overestimated his value as a true mediator. Neutrality is 
critical to be trusted as a mediator between polarized groups. “I want to be 
an activist professor,” Dr. Ramadan once told Ian Buruma. Being an activist 
requires that you choose sides. According to Scott Appleby, 
He [Ramadan] is accused of being Janus-faced. Well, of course he presents different 
faces to different audiences . . . he considers the opening he finds in his 
audience. Ramadan is in that sense a politician. He cultivates various publics in 
the Muslim world on a variety of issues . . . he’s got his ear to the ground of the 
Muslim world (Buruma 2007). 
 
While this strategy may help him retain the ear of the Muslims, it also 
leaves his Western audiences bemused by his contradictory statements. 
Hence, even as he is banned in some Islamic countries for not being Muslim 
enough, he is accused of doublespeak by his Western critics. 
 
SHOULD MEDIATORS BE FROM EITHER SIDE OF A DIVIDE TO BE GENUINE 
FACILITATORS? 
Because “the identity of the mediator affects the mediator’s influence, trust, 
and legitimacy” (Bercovitch 2007), the case is often made that authority 
figures such as religious leaders and prominent personalities from one or the 
other religion have an advantage over professional omnipartial mediators. 
Theorists who claim this do so because they suggest that these authority figures 
are usually trusted persons, have influence and leverage, and can, where 
necessary, bring resources and pressure to bear on the parties to settle. While 
this type of mediation has historically been used often, we need to recognize 
some of its limitations: 
 
1. Authority figures, when they are trusted, can both bring people to the table 
and keep them there. However, when they bring extrinsic pressure on their 
people to create agreements, they can run the risk of alienating the very 
people who trust them. 
2. Similarly, authority figures are often dependent upon the community for 
their own credibility. When their views cease to reflect the bias and prejudices 
of the larger group, they risk losing their authority. 
3. Religious leaders are constrained by their own strong belief systems and 
allegiances to their community. When mediating disputes involving their 
own and competing groups, they are likely to be viewed as partisan and 
distrusted by the other party. 
4. While persons rooted in a culture or religion are far more knowledgeable 
and able to bring the symbols and signs of their religion into the 
discussion, this intimacy itself can make it harder for them to step outside 
of the boundaries, vocabulary, and biases of their group. Where the 
fundamentals of their faith are at odds with those of the other group, 
it can be difficult for them to mediate. Sometimes in order to keep the 
mediation going, they are forced to seek particular interpretations or 
passages that either water down the problem tenets and passages or 
dilute them sufficiently to make them seem less threatening and more 
acceptable. This prevents them from getting to the volatile core issues 
that need to be addressed. Without being able to honestly address core 
divisive issues, mediation cannot create genuine understanding, empathy, 
or resolution. 
The professional mediator’s trust and credibility do not inherently come 
from the person being from and belonging to a certain ethnicity, religion, 
or nationality, while it is true that all these do play a part in building trust, 
at least in the beginning. Credibility comes from a track record; from the 
skill and ability to demonstrate a willingness to listen and be empathic to 
the party’s needs and vulnerabilities; from the ability to create and sustain a 
safe space where difficult conversations can be had; and from the trust that 
no coercion or pressure will be put on the parties to get them to sign off on 
agreements that harm them. A professional mediator, not having to speak for 
a constituency, also has the ability to raise and facilitate discussions, however 
painful, in a safe environment. 
 
The professional mediator’s agreements are, at the point of creating, nonbinding, 
but can be entered into court records or written up as a contract with 
the help of lawyers. Once having done so, the agreements become binding 
and also have the advantage of having been crafted by the parties themselves 
and hence are more likely to be followed through. In order to be effective, it 
is necessary for a mediator to have a working knowledge of the domain areas, 
whether they are religion, culture, or economic issues; it is not necessary for 
the mediator to be from within or of the culture. 
 
MEDIA AND THE CONDUCT OF MEDIATION IN THE PUBLIC GLARE 
Television is arguably the major institution that mediates contemporary 
public discourse (Dahlgren 1995). It is well accepted that this technological 
forum allows for multiple voices to circulate and negotiate, shaping public 
perception on issues and events. Television is an active participant and key 
instrument in the cultivation of citizenship and culture (Livingstone and Lunt 
1995). Yet, the nature of mass media discourse is often reduced to the level 
of spectacle, given its inherent need to appeal to and to entertain a large and 
varied audience demographic. Furthermore, ongoing sociocultural dialogue, 
the essence of genuine mediation, is constrained by the structural allowances 
of the television medium. 
 
This is not to say that media figures have little influence in public debate. 
On the contrary, they can be deeply influential and pivotal in public debates, 
providing certain framing of sensitive issues and events that can dominate 
audience perceptions. Media personalities also often have the capacity to 
bring differing perspectives to the table. While this is necessary, the ability 
to present multiple perspectives does not per se lend itself to helping parties 
move toward the resolution of their disputes. 
 
Ramadan was trying to play too many contradictory roles—an Islamic 
expert, TV show host, a bridge builder who had strong opinions of his own, 
an advisor on intercultural integration, and a neutral mediator. He was 
bound to alienate some of his audience as well as his employers. For good 
reasons, most mediation happens outside of the public glare. It is one thing 
to raise awareness and educate the people about various standpoints and 
perspectives through public discussions in the media. It is quite another to 
expect well-entrenched parties to engage in sensitive discussions in public. 
It is an axiom that for mediation to work, the parties require a safe space 
where they can talk freely and evince curiosity about the other side’s perspectives 
even when these perspectives are at first glance deeply offensive, 
problematic, and may entail dredging up historic grievances. In doing so, 
parties are likely to make themselves vulnerable to having their cherished 
ideas questioned and even proven. There is also the risk of upsetting the 
more orthodox members of their own constituencies who may accuse them 
of selling out or betrayal. 
 
Hence, we need to recognize the role media can play in this kind of discourse 
and its limitations. The discourse that takes place in the media can 
help inform and educate. We also need to bear in mind that deep-rooted 
political and cultural ideologies and social beliefs are rarely changed because 
of articles and TV shows. More often than not, people tune out of media that 
they disagree with and switch to channels that validate their biases. Issues 
related to religion, culture, and identity can rarely be discussed at the rational 
and empirical level because there are historic and emotional issues at stake. 
People need safe spaces and, most of the time, private conversations and 
dialogues for airing, let alone challenging, deep-seated beliefs. The problem 
with the public conduct of mediation is that it encourages public posturing, 
oversimplification of very complex issues, and a further polarizing of the 
groups. Leaders and critics of both sides find themselves constrained by the 
need to protect, defend, and justify their opinions. There is little learning and 
almost no reflection that can take place in public. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Mediation is a complex and messy process, and dialogue is hard to condense 
into sound bites. After all, “conflict resolution does more than address material 
clashes of interest; it speaks to social reintegration, restoration and 
redemption, existential security, personal transcendence and transformation” 
(Said and Funk 2002). Mediators must eschew the glare of publicity if they 
want to do real work. Activists can communicate in order to influence. Jour- 
nalists and academics who are acceptable to both sides must choose whether 
they will use their expertise to influence public opinion through the media 
or whether they want to engage in helping parties understand each other and 
negotiate differences. If the latter, they would be better off to keep their opinions 
to themselves and do the hard work of helping polarized groups engage 
behind the scenes. The authors, while recognizing the importance of the role 
that public intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan play in the discourse between 
Islam and the West, cannot but feel that in being party to and subject of the 
discussion themselves, they cannot play the role of a neutral mediator. Therefore, 
this essay is by no means a case in support of the dismissal of Ramadan 
from his mediation post at Rotterdam. Instead, we bring to the surface what 
we consider the more relevant issue of what constitutes a suitable mediator 
for such chronic and sensitive cross-cultural realities, highlighting the tradeoffs 
that occur in appointing a highly public figure such as Ramadan to address 
the growing “Islamophobia” in the Netherlands. 
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